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I.  Introduction
Plaintiff Suk Jae Chang (“Chang”), individually and on behalf of three purported classes of
similarly situated individuals, brings this action against two Boston-based companies, Defendants
Wozo LLC (“Wozo”) and Tatto, Inc. (“Tatto”) and a Missouri-based internet advertising company,
Defendant Adknowledge, Inc. (“Adknowledge”) (collectively, “the Defendants”).  Chang alleges
that he and members of the purported classes were the victims of a bait-and-switch scheme based
on advertisements jointly created by the Defendants and advertised to individuals playing internet
games.  Chang alleges that Wozo and Tatto violated the federal Electronic Fund Transfers Act
(“EFTA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1693 et seq., and that Wozo, Tatto and Adknowledge all violated the
Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, Mass. Gen. L. c. 93A.  Wozo and Tatto have moved to
dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, Adknowledge has moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal
Case 1:11-cv-10245-DJC   Document 54   Filed 03/28/12   Page 1 of 28
2jurisdiction, and all of the Defendants have moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  For the reasons discussed below, the Defendants’
various motions are DENIED.
II.  Burden of Proof and Standard of Review
A.  Rule 12(b)(1)
A federal case or controversy under Article III of the Constitution exists only when the party
soliciting federal court jurisdiction has standing.  Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 2012 WL 612793, at *3
(1st Cir. Feb. 28, 2012).  To have constitutional standing a plaintiff must establish three elements:
injury, causation, and redressability.  Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560–61 (1992)).  “Each element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which
the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the
successive stages of the litigation.”  Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561) (internal quotation marks
omitted).  Here, since the case is “at the pleading stage,” the Court “must determine whether
plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged facts required to meet the elements of Article III standing,”
Merriam v. Demoulas Super Mkts., 2012 WL 931347, at *2 (D. Mass. Mar. 20, 2012), and must
“accept as true all well-pleaded factual averments in the plaintiff’s . . . complaint and indulge all
reasonable inferences therefrom in his favor.”  Deniz v. Mun’y of Guaynabo, 285 F.3d 142, 144 (1st
Cir. 2002).
B.  Rule 12(b)(2)
On a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing that personal jurisdiction exists over the moving defendant.  Astro-Med, Inc. v. Nihon
Kohden Am., Inc., 591 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2009).  On such a motion, the Court considers “‘whether
the plaintiff has proffered evidence that, if credited, is enough to support findings of all facts
Case 1:11-cv-10245-DJC   Document 54   Filed 03/28/12   Page 2 of 28
3essential to personal jurisdiction.’”  Foster-Miller, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox Canada, 46 F.3d 138,
145 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting Boit v. Gar-Tec Prods., Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 675 (1st Cir. 1992)).  Under
this standard, the Court “must accept the plaintiff’s (properly documented) evidentiary proffers as
true for the purpose of determining the adequacy of the prima facie jurisdictional showing.”  Id. at
145.  The Court must also “take specific facts affirmatively alleged by the plaintiff as true (whether
or not disputed) and construe them in the light most congenial to the plaintiff’s jurisdictional claim.”
Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 142 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1998).  Facts put
forward by a defendant may also be considered, but “only to the extent that they are uncontradicted.”
Adelson v. Hananel, 510 F.3d 43, 48 (1st Cir. 2007).  Notwithstanding the liberality of this
approach, the court will not “credit conclusory allegations or draw farfetched inferences.”
Ticketmaster-N.Y., Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 203 (1st Cir. 1994).
C.  Rule 12(b)(6)
To survive a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint
“must ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,’
and allege ‘a plausible entitlement to relief.’” Decotiis v. Whittemore, 635 F.3d 22, 29 (1st Cir.
2011) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 559 (2007)).  “In resolving a motion
to dismiss, a court should employ a two-pronged approach.”  Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset,
640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (applying Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949-50
(2009) and Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).  “Step one:  isolate and ignore statements in the complaint
that simply offer legal labels and conclusions or merely rehash cause-of-action elements.”  Schatz
v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012).  “Step two:  take the
complaint’s well-pled (i.e., non-conclusory, non-speculative) facts as true, drawing all reasonable
inferences in the pleader’s favor, and see if they plausibly narrate a claim for relief.”  Id.  If they do,
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1 The following allegations are drawn from Chang’s Amended Complaint, D. 23, unless
noted otherwise.
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“the claim has facial plausibility” and can withstand a motion to dismiss.  Ocasio-Hernández, 640
F.3d at 12 (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949).
III.  Factual Background
A.  Factual Allegations in the Amended Complaint1
1.  Adknowledge and “Virtual Currency”
According to Chang, the combination of social networking websites such as Facebook with
traditional video games has resulted in the growing popularity of role-playing and simulation games
set in “virtual worlds.”  D. 23 ¶ 57.  The virtual worlds created by games like Second Life,
FarmVille, and Mafia Wars contain their own virtual economic structures, wherein game players
exchange “virtual currency” or goods within the game, usually to increase what Chang describes as
“their power or standing as a player.”  D. 23 ¶ 57.  Some virtual currency platforms are monetized
in terms of actual, real currency–that is, a player can obtain virtual currency by either (1) using real
currency to purchase virtual currency within the game or from an online exchange, or (2) purchasing
products from the platform’s advertising partners.  D. 23 ¶ 58.
Adknowledge is a Delaware corporation with its headquarters in Kansas City and with other
offices in the San Francisco Bay area, Los Angeles, New York City, Australia, Canada and the
United Kingdom.  D. 23 ¶ 10, 17; Affidavit of Adknowledge General Counsel Michael R. Geroe
(“Geroe Aff.”), D. 26-1 ¶ 2.  Adknowledge claims to be the largest privately-held internet
advertising network in the United States.  D. 23 ¶ 17.  As a service to the organizations (such as
Facebook and Zynga) that publish advertisements developed by Adknowledge, Adknowledge
reviews and assesses the contents of its advertisements and rates the advertisements on a spectrum
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5ranging from “maximum user experience” (meaning a simple or inexpensive offer that yields less
advertising revenue) to “maximum monetization” (meaning a costly or complex offer that yields
high advertising revenue) to enable Adknowledge’s publishers to choose how aggressive the
advertisements on their websites will be.  D. 23 ¶ 68.  Adknowledge also owns and operates a virtual
currency platform called “Super Rewards,” the units of which are referred to as “Super Rewards
Points.”  D. 23 ¶ 59.  Super Rewards Points may be used in a wide variety of internet games.  D. 23
¶ 59.
2.  Tatto and Wozo
Tatto is a corporation with its headquarters in Boston.  Am. Compl., D. 23 ¶ 9.  According
to Chang, Tatto had a poor business reputation as being responsible for a variety of mobile phone
and internet consumer “scams.”  D. 23 ¶ 31.  Chang alleges that in 2008, Tatto was twice sanctioned
and fined by the Attorney General of the State of Washington for deceptive advertising, D. 23 ¶ 33,
was banned from Facebook in 2009 for sending deceptive advertisements via Facebook’s network
in violation of Facebook’s policies, D. 23 ¶ 32, and that Zynga, a company that makes free internet
games that contain advertisements, terminated its relationship with Tatto, with Zynga’s CEO stating
that “[w]e have worked hard to police and remove bad offers” and identifying Tatto as “the worst
offender” in this regard.  D. 23 ¶ 35. 
In or about fall 2009, prior to the formation of Wozo, Tatto obtained the internet domain
name “wozo.com” (the “Wozo website”).  D. 23 ¶ 21.  At the time, Tatto listed its CEO, Lin Miao
(“Miao”), as the administrative, technical and registrant contact for the Wozo website, and Miao’s
e-mail address at “tattomedia.com” and Tatto’s physical address at 10 High Street, Boston were
provided as the contact information in the Wozo website’s domain registration.  D. 23 ¶ 21.
On or about July 26, 2010, Tatto and/or its representatives, employees, agents and assigns
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6formed Wozo as a limited liability company and transferred ownership of the Wozo website to the
newly-formed company.  D. 23 ¶¶ 22-23.  Wozo was undercapitalized and did not have any
employees.  D. 23 ¶¶ 29-30.  Wozo’s officers were the principals, officers and/or founders of Tatto,
and Wozo’s business functions were performed by Tatto officers and employees.  D. 23 ¶¶ 27, 29.
Chang alleges that during regular business hours there was often no Wozo representative at Wozo’s
registered business address, which is located less than one block from Tatto’s headquarters, and that
Wozo did not conduct actual business at its registered address.  D. 23 ¶¶ 8, 28.
Wozo’s sole business activity was a “free” poster scheme central to this case (and discussed
in more detail in a separate section below).  D. 23 ¶ 24.  On or about September 9, 2010, Tatto
President Andrew Bachmann (“Bachmann”) sent an e-mail to advertising affiliates identifying
himself as a “Founder of Tatto” and inviting them to promote “a poster subscription offer called
Wozo” that he had “recently founded.”  D. 23 ¶ 26.  On or about November 12, 2010, Bachman sent
another e-mail to advertising affiliates inviting them to promote the Wozo poster promotion.  D. 23
¶ 26.  Tatto call center employees handled complaints from dissatisfied Wozo customers.  D. 23 ¶
29.  Tatto employees received returned Wozo posters and stored them in various Tatto offices,
including Miao and Bachmann’s offices.  D. 23 ¶ 29.
3.  The “Free” Poster Scheme
Through the Wozo website, Wozo sold posters and fine art prints.  D. 23 ¶ 40.  Wozo
asserted on the Wozo website that it had “100’s of thousands of customers.”  D. 23 ¶ 40.  After Tatto
acquired the Wozo website in 2009 and created Wozo in 2010, Tatto and Wozo formed a “poster
club,” members of which would receive an automatic shipment of two posters per month in
exchange for a $29.99 monthly membership fee.  D. 23 ¶ 41.  
Concurrent with the formation of the poster club, Tatto and Wozo launched a “free” poster
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shipped all posters back to Wozo (at the consumer’s expense).  D. 23 ¶¶ 70-71.
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scheme.  D. 23 ¶ 42.  Tatto and Wozo created, developed and placed banners and other internet
advertisements offering a free poster to consumers in return for a 99-cent shipping fee.  D. 23 ¶ 42.
An internet user who clicked on one of these advertisements was redirected to an order form on the
Wozo website to select a poster, provide shipping and contact information, and complete their order
by submitting a billing address and debit or credit card information.  D. 23 ¶¶ 43, 45.  Consumers
who completed an order form and provided payment information for the shipping fee
were–unbeknownst to the consumer–enrolled in the poster club.  D. 23 ¶ 42.  Tatto and Wozo
retained the payment information of poster club members.  D. 23 ¶ 42.  Unless the consumer
cancelled their membership in the poster club within four days of ordering a “free” poster, they were
charged $29.99 per month for their membership in the poster club.  D. 23 ¶ 42.2
The order form on the Wozo website included no information regarding the poster club, the
charges associated with the poster club, nor any mechanism for cancelling a membership in the
poster club, nor did it indicate that Wozo would retain any payment information submitted by the
consumer.  D. 23 ¶ 45.  The order form did include a pre-checked box located next to the statement
“I Agree to Terms and Conditions,” D. 23 ¶ 45, but the text of that statement was not a hyperlink
to any additional terms and conditions, D. 23 ¶ 47, nor was there any apparent way to navigate the
website to discover any additional terms and conditions beyond the “free” poster and the 99-cent
shipping charge.  D. 23 ¶ 45.  The order form did not include any contact information for Wozo or
Tatto.  D. 23 ¶ 45.
Tatto and Wozo partnered with organizations involved in online advertising, internet gaming,
and social networking to offer additional “free” benefits, including but not limited to providing
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8“free” virtual currency, as an extra enticement to potential poster scheme consumers.  D. 23 ¶ 56.
Adknowledge was one of Tatto and Wozo’s partners in this regard, and they created and developed
a promotional campaign, including internet banners and other advertisements, offering both a “free”
poster and “free” Super Rewards Points for a single 99-cent shipping fee.  D. 23 ¶ 60.  Adknowledge
included contractual terms in its agreement with Wozo and Tatto to control the content of these
advertisements.  D. 23 ¶ 64.  The advertisements did not mention the poster club, the charges
associated with the poster club, or mechanisms for cancelling a membership in the poster club, nor
did they indicate that Wozo would retain any payment information submitted by the consumer.  D.
23 ¶ 60.  Tatto and Wozo agreed to pay Adknowledge $19 for each consumer who purchased a
“free” poster after clicking on one of these advertisements, and Tatto, Wozo and Adknowledge
cooperated technologically to track and share information about the results of the promotion.  D. 23
¶ 62.
4.  Chang
Chang resides in Arcadia, California.  D. 23 ¶ 7.  He uses Super Reward Points.  D. 23 ¶ 72.
In or about October 2010, he saw an internet advertisement for the “free” poster and Super Rewards
Points scheme.  D. 23 ¶ 73.  He clicked on the advertisement, which redirected him to the order form
on the Wozo website.  D. 23 ¶ 73.  The order form did not include information about the existence
of the monthly membership product, its cost, or other terms and conditions of the transaction.  D.
23 ¶ 73.  Chang selected a poster from the Wozo website to obtain the promised Super Rewards
Points and paid for the 99-cent shipping fee with his debit card.  D. 23 ¶ 74.  At no time during the
checkout process was Chang informed that he would be charged for anything but the 99-cent
shipping fee.  D. 23 ¶ 74.  Wozo later charged Chang’s debit card for a $29.99 monthly membership
subscription fee.  D. 23 ¶ 74.
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9B.  Proffers of Jurisdictional Evidence
1.  Geroe Affidavit Proffered by Adknowledge
As noted above, Adknowledge contests that this Court has personal jurisdiction over it and
in support of this position submitted the affidavit of Adknowledge General Counsel Michael R.
Geroe (“Geroe”).  D. 26-1.  Geroe asserts that Adknowledge’s Super Rewards platform “provides
an online game publisher with an ‘offer wall’ the publisher can make available to its players,” which
features ads from many advertisers “such as Wozo.com.”  D. 26-1 ¶¶ 11-12.  According to Geroe,
“[a]ds on the offer wall are displayed somewhat like classified ads run in a newspaper,” and “[g]ame
publishers can make money when users respond to an ad on the offer wall.”  D. 26-1 ¶¶ 13-14.
Accordingly, game publishers “grant points or credits useful in their game to players as an incentive
to visit the offer wall and respond to an ad.  When a player clicks on an offer, the player is directed
to the advertiser’s website . . . to complete any subsequent transaction with the merchant.”  D. 26-1
¶ 14.  Geroe asserts that the advertiser’s website is “outside of the control of either Adknowledge
or the game publisher.”  D. 26-1 ¶ 14.  Geroe also asserts that “Super Rewards does not initiate
contact with consumers,” although he concedes that “it provides customer service for the game
publisher relating to customer inquiries about receiving points following their participation in an
offer.”  D. 26-1 ¶ 28.
According to Geroe, as a general matter, “Adknowledge facilitates the publication of
advertisements,” but “does not “create or develop advertising content for or on behalf of the
advertisers,” “does not contribute to or have any ability to control representations made on an
advertiser’s web site after the consumer clicks on an ad and leaves the offer wall,” and “plays no role
in fulfilling the advertiser’s product or offer” beyond crediting consumers “with the appropriate
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game publisher’s points upon receiving confirmation from the advertiser that the consumer
participated in the offer advertised.”  D. 26-1 ¶¶ 16-19.  Specifically, Geroe acknowledged that
while Wozo and Tatto “advertised wall-hanging posters on the Super Rewards offer wall . . .
Adknowledge did not control the content of the Wozo website” and “did not create any
advertisements for Wozo.”  D. 26-1 ¶¶ 20-22.  “Following reasonable investigation,” Geroe stated
that “to the best of my knowledge and belief, no person at Adknowledge had direct contact or
communication with a person at Wozo pertaining to the advertisement of wall-hanging posters on
the Super Rewards offer wall.”  D. 26-1 ¶ 24.  Geroe also noted that Wozo agreed to Adknowledge’s
terms of service, which according to Geroe provide “that the transaction occurred in Kansas City,
Missouri, was governed by Missouri law, and that any dispute would be resolved in Missouri.”  D.
26-1 ¶ 25.  
Finally, Geroe asserts that Adknowledge has no offices, statutory agents, telephone listings,
mailing addresses, bank accounts, or licenses in Massachusetts, nor does it advertise in
Massachusetts newspapers, magazines, or other print, radio or television media.  D. 26-1 ¶ 23, 35-
38. 
2.  Johnson Declaration Proffered by Chang
Chang responded to the Geroe affidavit by submitting the affidavit of a consumer who
contacted Adknowledge to complain after she was charged $29.99 after participating in the “free”
poster and Super Rewards Points scheme and placing an order via the Wozo website.  Declaration
of Sarah Johnson (“Johnson Dec.”), D. 32.  Johnson, who lives in Michigan, asserts that on October
18 and 19, 2010, she exchanged e-mails with an Adknowledge employee who identified herself as
a representative of “Super Rewards Customer Service,” and that in response to Johnson’s complaints
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about being unwittingly enrolled in the poster club and charged $29.99, the Adknowledge employee
stated that “the offer does indicate that a charge of $29.99 will be made to qualify for [Super
Rewards] points.”  D. 32 at 1-2; D. 32-1 at 2.  The e-mails discussed in the Johnson Declaration are
attached as an exhibit thereto.  D. 32-1.
3.  Contract between Wozo and Adknowledge
After a colloquy between the Court, counsel for Adknowledge and counsel for Chang at the
motion hearing, Adknowledge agreed to provide the Court with a copy of the contract between
Wozo and Adknowledge to determine if the contract identified Wozo’s location and put
Adknowledge on notice that it was entering a contractual relationship with a Massachusetts
company.  Adknowledge subsequently submitted the affidavit of Jeremy Fisher (“Fisher”), the
Director of Adknowledge’s “BidSystem.”  D. 40.  Fisher asserts that on August 31, 2010, Wozo
entered into two agreements with Adknowledge, the first of which provides “general terms and
conditions for Adknowledge’s BidSystem service,” and the second of which “provides more specific
terms relating to Adknowledge’s Rewards network which apply to the kind of offers at issue in this
lawsuit.”  D. 40 ¶¶ 2-4.  Attached to the affidavit were what Fisher describes as “true and correct
cop[ies] of [each] agreement at the time Wozo entered into it.”  D. 40 ¶¶ 3-4 (referring to D. 40-1
and 40-2).  The documents appear to be form documents proffered to entities that contract with
Adknowledge.  D. 40-1, 40-2.  Adknowledge did not submit any documentation to the Court
showing that Wozo agreed to the terms set forth in the documents or showing what information
Wozo provided to Adknowledge if and when it agreed to such terms.  As a general matter, however,
the form documents do suggest that Adknowledge was aware of the physical location of advertisers
like Wozo that contract with Adknowledge via its BidSystem service.  See, e.g., D. 40-1 at 3 ¶ 10
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(“after termination or expiration of this Agreement, any amount remaining in an Advertiser account
under $50 shall be forfeit to Adknowledge; Adknowledge shall mail one check, first class, to the last
known address of Advertiser for any greater amount”); D. 40-2 (same). 
Chang replied to the Fisher affidavit by submitting purported screenshots of Adknowledge’s
on-line sign-up mechanism for BidSystem.  Pl. Response, D. 41 at 3-4.  The screenshots demonstrate
that the “Account Information” required by Adknowledge to open a BidSystem account includes a
company name, a company address, and the name and address of both a management contact and
a billing contact.  D. 41 at 3-4.  The screenshots also suggest that Adknowledge reviews the
information submitted through the BidSystem service.  D. 41 at 4.
IV.  Procedural History
By letter dated January 13, 2011, Chang sent a Mass. Gen. L. c. 93A demand letter to the
Defendants seeking, on his own behalf and purportedly on behalf of all others similarly situated, “the
maximum damages permitted by law, including at a minimum the $25 statutory damages per [c]lass
member, together with all related costs and attorney’s fees that Mr. Chang and the class have
incurred.”  Wozo and Tatto’s Motion to Dismiss, Ex. 1-A (93A Demand Letter), D. 25-2 at 5.
By letter dated February 11, 2011, Wozo offered to pay Chang $350 plus reasonable
attorneys fees and asserted that this amount “fully satisfies Mr. Chang’s claim and provides him with
all of the relief to which he would be entitled were he to prevail in this case,” and stated that “no
payment is being made to the putative class Mr. Chang claims to represent, as no class exists here.”
Wozo and Tatto’s Motion to Dismiss, Ex. 1-B (Wozo 93A Offer Letter), D. 25-2 at 11.  Wozo
enclosed a cashier’s check for $350 with its letter.  D. 25-2 at 11.  Chang later rejected this offer.
Wozo and Tatto’s Motion to Dismiss, Ex. 1-C, D. 25-2 at 13.
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On February 14, 2011, Chang filed a three-count complaint in this Court on his own behalf
and on behalf of three overlapping purported classes.  D. 1 ¶¶ 53-65.  The first count was on behalf
of a purported class of individuals “who participated in Wozo’s ‘free’ poster promotion and were
charged for a monthly membership in the Wozo poster club even though the monthly membership
was not referenced on the pages of the Wozo [w]ebsite that were necessarily viewed to complete the
transaction,” and alleged that Wozo and Tatto violated Mass. Gen. L. c. 93A.  D. 1 ¶¶ 58, 66-85.
The second count was on behalf of a purported class of individuals who both were members of the
first class and “were offered Super Rewards points for their participation in [Wozo and Tatto’s]
‘free’ poster promotion and were charged for a monthly membership in the Wozo poster club even
though the monthly membership was not referenced on the pages of the Wozo [w]ebsite that were
necessarily viewed to complete the transaction,” and alleged that Adknowledge violated Mass. Gen.
L. c. 93A.  D. 1 ¶¶ 59, 86-100.  The third count was on behalf of a purported class of individuals
who were both members of the first class and “whose debit cards were charged for a monthly
membership subscription in the Wozo poster club even though the monthly membership was not
referenced on the pages of the Wozo website that were necessarily viewed to complete the
transaction,” and alleged that Wozo and Tatto violated the EFTA.  D. 1 ¶¶ 60, 101-117.  On April
15, 2011, Chang amended his complaint to add factual allegations, but did not alter the definitions
of the purported classes or the nature of the three counts alleged against the Defendants.  D. 23 ¶¶
77-79, 85-136.
On April 29, 2011, Wozo and Tatto moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), alleging that
Wozo’s settlement offer deprived Chang of legal standing, and under Rule 12(b)(6), alleging that
Chang failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  D. 25.  That same day, Adknowledge
Case 1:11-cv-10245-DJC   Document 54   Filed 03/28/12   Page 13 of 28
14
moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2), alleging that this Court lacked personal jurisdiction over
Adknowledge, and under Rule 12(b)(6), alleging that Chang failed to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.  D. 26.
The Court held a hearing on the various motions, took the motions under advisement, and
permitted Chang and Adknowledge to file supplemental materials regarding personal jurisdiction,
including documentation of the contractual relationship between Adknowledge, Wozo and Tatto.




A plaintiff must have suffered an injury to have standing to bring a claim in federal court.
Katz, 2012 WL 612793 at *3(citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61).  Wozo and Tatto argue that any
injury suffered by Chang was cured when Wozo offered to settle his claims for $350 plus reasonable
attorneys fees, notwithstanding Chang’s rejection of Wozo’s offer, and that accordingly Chang lacks
standing to bring this suit and the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear it.  Wozo and
Tatto’s Memo, D. 25-1 at 14-17.  The Court rejects this argument.
First, Wozo and Tatto are clearly mistaken when they assert that Wozo’s settlement offer
“afforded [Chang] all of the relief he could obtain if he were to prevail at trial.”  D. 25-1 at 14.  To
the contrary, Chang’s 93A demand letter clearly indicated the class nature of his claims and sought
relief for all members of the class.  D. 25-2 at 5.  Although Chang’s 93A demand letter did not
specify an aggregate amount requested on behalf of he the class (asking instead for a minimum of
$25 damages per class member, D. 25-2 at 7), Chang’s amended complaint asserts that the classwide
Case 1:11-cv-10245-DJC   Document 54   Filed 03/28/12   Page 14 of 28
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Wozo and Tatto Memo, D. 25-1 at 17.  Under chapter 93A, “[a]ny person receiving [a chapter
93A] demand for relief who . . . makes a written tender of settlement which is rejected by the
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tender is a question of fact,” not purely a question of law, and is “determined in light of the
attendant circumstances,” RGJ Assocs., Inc. v. Stainsafe, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 2d. 215, 239 (D.
Mass. 2004), and as such is inappropriate, on the present record, for the Court to resolve at this
juncture.
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amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000.  D. 23 ¶ 13.  At the motion to dismiss stage, and absent
any evidentiary submissions to the contrary by the Defendants, the Court accepts this allegation as
true.  Deniz, 285 F.3d at 144.  Accordingly, Wozo’s offer of $350 plus costs to Chang, coupled with
Wozo’s express statement that “no payment is being made to the putative class Mr. Chang claims
to represent,” D. 25-2 at 11, was clearly insufficient to remedy the classwide injury alleged by
Chang and fell well short of the maximum relief Chang might obtain should he and the purported
classes he seeks to represent ultimately prevail at trial.3
Second, even if Wozo’s offer to Chang could be read as a redress of Chang’s injury sufficient
to guarantee that he “no longer has a personal stake in the case,” Wilson v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 671 F.2d 673, 679 (1st Cir. 1982) (cited by Wozo and Tatto, D. 25-1 at 16), it is
highly unlikely that the case as a whole would be moot.  “[O]rdinarily[,] the mootness of the
substantive claim of the named plaintiff in a purported but uncertified class action moots the entire
case,” but “[s]ome courts have recognized a limited exception to this general rule if the defendant
has deliberately and artificially created mootness by satisfying the named plaintiff’s claim,
effectively avoiding judicial resolution of a matter by ‘picking off’ the named plaintiffs.”  Wilson,
671 F.2d at 679; see also Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank, Jackson, Miss. v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339
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(1980) (noting that “[r]equiring multiple plaintiffs to bring separate actions, which effectively could
be ‘picked off’ by a defendant’s tender of judgment before an affirmative ruling on class
certification could be obtained, obviously would frustrate the objectives of class actions; moreover
it would invite waste of judicial resources by stimulating successive suits brought by others claiming
aggrievement”); Griffith v. Bowen, 678 F. Supp. 942, 946 (D. Mass. 1988) (stating that a
defendant’s “voluntary payment” to named plaintiffs in a purported class action was “deceptively
kind” and “conjures up the spectre that the [defendant] may, in effect be attempting somehow to end
this litigation before the claims presented here are addressed”).  
Finally, as a matter of Massachusetts law, efforts by a defendant to “pick off” named
plaintiffs in a purported class action have been discussed with disfavor in the specific context of
chapter 93A claims.  In Meaney v. OneBeacon Ins. Grp., LLC, No. 07-1294-BLS2, 2007 WL
5112809, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 12, 2007) (Gants, J.), the named plaintiff in a purported class
action moved to amend her complaint, which initially included only common law claims, to add
classwide chapter 93A claims; the defendant opposed the motion on the ground that the defendant
had offered to settle the plaintiff’s individual chapter 93A claim.   Now-Supreme Judicial Court
Justice Gants granted the plaintiff’s motion and held that the defendant:
may not avoid a class action simply by paying the amount due to the named plaintiff.  The
plaintiffs in their complaint have raised a significant legal claim which is entitled to
resolution. . . . [The defendant] cannot evade resolution of this legal question, involving
small amounts of money for each individual [plaintiff] but larger amounts of money for the
putative class . . . simply by paying [the small amount] to the named plaintiff, since the
plaintiff seeks to act on behalf of the class of insureds similarly situated.  Rather, [the
defendant] can evade resolution of this issue only if [the defendant] were to commit to
paying [the requested amount] to all [plaintiffs].
Meaney, 2007 WL 5112809 at *2 (granting motion to amend).  At the current stage of this litigation,
the Court must “indulge all reasonable inferences” from Chang’s factual allegations “in his favor,”
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Deniz, 285 F.3d at 144, and Wozo’s settlement offer, viewed in that light, appears to be an attempt
to “pick off” Chang.  
Accordingly, the Court rejects Tatto and Wozo’s challenge to Chang’s standing and to this
Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
B.  Personal Jurisdiction
Adknowledge argues that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over it.  “In determining
whether a non-resident defendant is subject to its jurisdiction, a federal court exercising diversity
jurisdiction ‘is the functional equivalent of a state court sitting in the forum state.’” Daynard v. Ness,
Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A., 290 F.3d 42, 51 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting Sawtelle v.
Farrell, 70 F.3d 1381, 1387 (1st Cir. 1995) (further citation omitted)).  Accordingly, this Court’s
personal jurisdiction may not exceed the limits set by Massachusetts’ long-arm statute and the
Constitution.  Lyle Richards Int’l, Ltd. v. Ashworth, Inc., 132 F.3d 111, 112 (1st Cir. 1997).
Because courts construe “the Massachusetts long-arm statute as being coextensive with the limits
permitted by the Constitution,” this Court may “turn directly to the constitutional test for
determining specific jurisdiction.”  Adelson v. Hananel, 652 F.3d 75, 80 (1st Cir. 2011).
There are two types of personal jurisdiction:  specific and general.  Cossaboon v. Me. Med.
Ctr., 600 F.3d 25, 31 (1st Cir. 2010).  Specific jurisdiction exists where the plaintiff’s cause of action
arises from or relates directly to the defendant’s contacts with the forum state, Pritzker v. Yari, 42
F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 1994); general jurisdiction is broader, and “subjects the defendant to suit in the
forum state’s courts ‘in respect to all matters, even those that are unrelated to the defendant’s
contacts with the forum.’”  Cossaboon, 600 F.3d at 31 (quoting Phillips Exeter Acad. v. Howard
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Phillips Fund, Inc., 196 F.3d 284, 288 (1st Cir. 1999)).4  “The First Circuit employs a tripartite
analysis to determine whether specific jurisdiction is appropriate:  1) whether the claims arise out
of or are related to the defendant’s in-state activities, 2) whether the defendant has purposefully
availed itself of the laws of the forum state and 3) whether the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable
under the circumstances.”  Pesmel N. Am., LLC v. Caraustar Indus., Inc., 754 F. Supp. 2d 168, 172
(D. Mass. 2010).  The first prong, relatedness, “is a ‘flexible, relaxed’ standard that focuses on the
nexus between the plaintiff’s claim and the defendant’s contacts with the forum state.”  Id. (quoting
Astro-Med, 591 F.3d at 9.  One co-defendant may have its contacts with a state imputed to another
co-defendant where the co-defendants lead “the public to believe they were co-venturers” or where
one co-defendant ratifies the other co-defendant’s transactional contact with the forum state by
“knowingly accepting the benefits of the transaction.”  Daynard, 290 F.3d at 57, 60.  The second
prong, purposeful availment, requires some act or series of acts “by which the defendant
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”  Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
The purposeful availment test “focuses on the defendant’s intentionality,” and “is only satisfied
when the defendant purposefully and voluntarily directs his activities toward the forum so that he
should expect, by virtue of the benefit he receives, to be subject to the court’s jurisdiction based on
these contacts.”  United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 623-24 (1st Cir. 2001).  The
final prong, reasonableness, turns on a series of so-called “Gestalt factors,” including:  (1) the
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defendant’s burden of appearing; (2) the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the
plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) the judicial system’s interest in
obtaining the most effective resolution of the controversy; and (5) the common interests of all
sovereigns in promoting substantive social policies.  Cossaboon, 600 F.3d at 33 n. 3.
Chang’s allegations and his evidentiary proffers in support of jurisdiction, taken as true and
construed in the light most favorable to jurisdiction, Foster-Miller, 46 F.3d at 145; Mass. Sch. of
Law at Andover, 142 F.3d at 34, are sufficient to establish that this Court has specific personal
jurisdiction over Adknowledge.  As to relatedness, Chang’s claims arise out of 1) various internet
advertisements asserting that consumers who pay a single 99-cent fee would receive both a poster
and Super Rewards Points, and 2) the Wozo website transaction wherein consumers were allegedly
informed that they were agreeing only to a single 99-cent payment but were in fact charged $29.99
fees on a recurring monthly basis.  While the parties dispute whether the advertisements qualify as
contacts with Massachusetts (with Chang pointing both to Wozo’s role in crafting the advertisements
and its status as a company headquartered in Massachusetts and to Chang’s allegation that at least
some class members are Massachusetts residents, D. 31 at 14-15, and Adknowledge pointing both
to the fact that Chang himself is not a Massachusetts resident, and to the text of the contract between
Adknowledge and Wozo, which enabled the creation of the advertisements, limited Adknowledge’s
role in the content and placement of the advertisements, and stated that “the parties’ transaction
occurred in Kansas City, was governed by Missouri law, and that any dispute [over the terms of the
contract] would be resolved in Missouri,” D. 27 at 7-8), Adknowledge has not disputed that the
subsequent transaction on the Wozo website is a Massachusetts contact.  D. 27 at 7.  Accordingly,
the Court need not resolve the dispute over the jurisdictional import of the advertisements, because
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the Wozo website transaction(s) can be imputed to Adknowledge for jurisdictional purposes.  The
public could have been led to believe–and Chang alleges that both he and others5 did in fact
believe–that entering financial information on the Wozo website would result in the joint provision
of a poster (from Wozo in Massachusetts) and Super Rewards Points (from Adknowledge).  Further,
based on the Johnson Declaration, it appears that Adknowledge specifically held itself out as an
authority on the legitimacy of financial transactions made on the Wozo website.  D. 32 ¶¶ 4-5.
Additionally, Chang alleges that Adknowledge received $19 for each money-for-posters-and-Super-
Rewards-Points transaction processed on the Wozo website, D. 23 ¶ 62, an allegation which, if true,
would constitute Adknowledge’s knowing receipt of the benefits of the Wozo website transaction
sufficient to ratify that transaction.  Taken together and viewed in the light most favorable to
jurisdiction, these factual allegations and evidentiary proffers are sufficient to impute the Wozo
website transactions to Adknowledge for the limited purpose of establishing personal jurisdiction.
Daynard, 290 F.3d at 57, 59-60.
As to purposeful availment, although Adknowledge originally disputed whether
“Adknowledge knew that Wozo was in Boston,” D. 27 at 13, the contractual language and
BidSystem screenshots subsequently provided to the Court by the parties clearly suggest that
Adknowledge did in fact know that Wozo and Tatto were both based in Massachusetts.
Accordingly, Adknowledge was in a position to “expect, by virtue of the benefit [it] receive[d]”
from individual consumer transactions exchanging money for Wozo’s posters and Adknowledge’s
Super Rewards Points, “to be subject to [a Massachusetts] court’s jurisdiction” in the event that legal
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disputes arose out of those transactions.  Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d at 624.6  Indeed, the
Johnson Declaration suggests that Adknowledge actually received consumer complaints about Wozo
website transactions and responded to these complaints by defending the Wozo website transaction
as valid.  Adknowledge was clearly in a position to expect that it could be haled into court alongside
Wozo if, as here, the aforementioned consumer complaints ultimately formed the basis of legal
claims.
The Gestalt factors also tip in favor of jurisdiction.  Adknowledge’s burden of appearing
from Missouri is not overly onerous, especially in light of the fact that Adknowledge has offices not
only in Missouri but also in New York.  Massachusetts has a significant interest in resolving
disputes about the propriety of the conduct of Massachusetts businesses, including conduct jointly
undertaken by Massachusetts business such as Wozo and Tatto working in concert with out-of-state
businesses such as Adknowledge.  Both Chang’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief
and the judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most effective resolution of Chang’s claims
recommend a single action in this Court rather than separate actions against Adknowledge in a
separate forum and against Wozo and Tatto here.  The final factor, the common interest of all
sovereigns in promoting substantive social policies, is not to the contrary.
C.  Rule 12(b)(6)
The Defendants, Tatto, Wozo and Adknowledge, assert among them five distinct grounds
for dismissing Chang’s amended complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be
Case 1:11-cv-10245-DJC   Document 54   Filed 03/28/12   Page 21 of 28
22
granted.  The Court will address each argument in turn.
1.  Injury
First, Tatto and Wozo argue that the chapter 93A claims in Chang’s amended complaint must
be dismissed because claims brought under that chapter require a showing of loss or injury and
Chang cannot show any injury in light of the rejected settlement offer proffered by Wozo.  D. 25-1.
This argument is unavailing for all the reasons discussed above in the Court’s analysis of Tatto and
Wozo’s 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, which was similarly based on the incorrect assertion that
Wozo’s settlement offer was sufficient to cure the injury alleged in Chang’s 93A demand letter and
subsequent complaint filed in this Court. 
2.  “Authorization” under EFTA
Next, Tatto and Wozo argue that Chang’s EFTA claim must be dismissed.  EFTA permits
“[a] preauthorized electronic fund transfer from a consumer’s account” when it is “authorized by
the consumer . . . in writing, and a copy of such authorization shall be provided to the consumer
when made.”  15 U.S.C. § 1693e(a).  Tatto and Wozo allege that the $29.99 monthly fees charged
to Chang and purported class members were authorized and consistent with EFTA because:
the Wozo website contained a check box that indicated that all customers, including
Plaintiff, “agree[d] to all terms and conditions,” [D. 23 ¶ 47,] including the terms of
the membership and fees related thereto.  Thus, Plaintiff was, at the very least,
informed that there were additional terms and conditions that applied to his purchase,
but he nevertheless chose not to determine what they were, instead submitting his
debit card information and receiving his chosen poster and promised club
membership.
D. 25-1 at 20.  The allegation that Chang “chose not to determine” the content of any “additional
terms and conditions” is immaterial.  Chang’s amended complaint clearly alleges that he agreed to
pay for a one-time 99-cent shipping fee, that he was instead charged a recurring $29.99 monthly fee,
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and that there was no apparent way for a consumer to navigate the Wozo website to discover any
additional terms and conditions beyond the promise of Super Rewards Points, a “free” poster and
a 99-cent shipping charge.  D. 23 ¶¶ 45, 47, 73-75.  To the extent that Tatto and Wozo intend to
assert that the “terms and conditions” associated with the Wozo website did in fact include a
recurring $29.99 fee (and thus that Chang did in fact authorize Wozo to collect a $29.99 fee from
Chang), such assertion is a factual dispute with Chang’s amended complaint and is, accordingly,
inappropriate for resolution in the context of a motion to dismiss.
3.  Allegations Against Tatto
Tatto and Wozo’s final argument is that Chang’s claims against Tatto should be dismissed,
both because Chang may not pierce the corporate veil between Tatto and Wozo to hold Tatto
responsible for Wozo’s conduct and because Chang’s allegations specific to Tatto are insufficient
to satisfy the higher pleading standard required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) for allegations of fraud.
Under Massachusetts law, corporations “ordinarily are regarded as separate and distinct
entities.”  Scott v. NG U.S. 1, Inc., 450 Mass. 760, 766 (2008).  In two situations, however, courts
may “pierce the corporate veil” between parent and subsidiary corporations:  first, “where the parent
exercises ‘some form of pervasive control’ of the activities of the subsidiary ‘and there is some
fraudulent or injurious consequence of the intercorporate relationship,’” id. (quoting My Bread
Baking Co. v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 353 Mass. 614, 619 (1968)), and second, “when there is a
confused intermingling of activity of two or more corporations engaged in common enterprise with
substantial disregard of the separate nature of the corporate entities, or serious ambiguity about the
manner and capacity in which the various corporations and their respective representatives are
acting.”  My Bread Baking, 353 Mass. at 619. 
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In applying this veil-piercing analysis, Massachusetts law looks to the following twelve
factors:  (1) common ownership; (2) pervasive control; (3) confused intermingling of business
assets; (4) thin capitalization; (5) nonobservance of corporate formalities; (6) absence of corporate
records; (7) no payment of dividends; (8) insolvency at the time of the litigated transaction; (9)
siphoning away of corporation’s funds by dominant shareholder; (10) nonfunctioning of officers and
directors; (11) use of the corporation for transactions of the dominant shareholders; and (12) use of
the corporation in promoting fraud.  Attorney General v. M.C.K., Inc., 432 Mass. 546, 555 n. 19
(2000) (citing Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co. v. Checkers, Inc., 754 F.2d 10, 14-16 (1st Cir. 1985)).
“The factors are weighed, not counted,”  George Hyman Constr. Co. v. Gateman, 16 F. Supp. 2d
129, 158 (D. Mass. 1998); a dual showing of “common ownership and control” and “funds used
interchangeably” may be sufficient.  Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling, 754 F.2d at 15.  Ultimately, to
pierce the corporate veil, a court must conclude after evaluating these factors “that the parent
corporation directed and controlled the subsidiary” and “used it for an improper purpose.”  Scott,
450 Mass. at 768.
Here, Chang has alleged, among other things, that Tatto created and owned Wozo (consistent
with the first factor enumerated in M.C.K.), D. 23 ¶ 22, 30; Tatto controlled Wozo in its entirety and
Tatto employees conducted all of Wozo’s business (consistent with the second, tenth and eleventh
factors), D. 23 ¶¶ 24-27, 29; Tatto stored, received and controlled merchandise that was allegedly
Wozo’s (or, conversely, that Tatto’s offices were in fact Wozo’s offices) (consistent with the third
factor), D. 23 ¶¶ 28-29; Wozo was undercapitalized (consistent with the fourth factor), and that Tatto
created Wozo for the purpose of conducting allegedly fraudulent activities without drawing the
scrutiny associated with Tatto’s reputation for scurrilous business dealings (consistent with the
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twelfth factor), D. 23 ¶ 22, 30-36.  Taken as true, as they must be when resolving a motion to
dismiss, these allegations are more than sufficient to permit the conclusion that Tatto directed and
controlled Wozo and used Wozo for an improper purpose.  Accordingly, at least for the purposes
of this motion to dismiss, it is appropriate for the Court to treat Tatto and Wozo as alter egos.  Scott,
450 Mass. at 768.
Treating all of the allegations directed at Wozo in Chang’s amended complaint as allegations
directed at both Wozo and Tatto, it is clear that the allegations against Tatto, to the extent they sound
in fraud, are–contrary to Wozo and Tatto’s argument, D. 25-1 at 21-22, 24-26–sufficient to satisfy
the special pleading standard for fraud set forth in Rule 9(b),which states that “a party must state
with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).  “Under that
heightened standard, a plaintiff must identify the fraudulent statement or representation, the person
making the statement, and when the statement was made.”  Crisp Human Capital Ltd. v. Authoria
Inc., 613 F. Supp. 2d 136, 140 (D. Mass. 2009) (citing Rodi v. S. New Eng. Sch. of Law, 389 F.3d
5, 15 (1st Cir. 2004)).  Here, Chang alleges that the representation that consumers could exchange
a single 99-cent fee and receive a “free” poster from Wozo and Tatto and Super Rewards Points
from Adknowledge was fraudulent where in fact they were being unknowingly charged a $29.99
poster club monthly fee, and that it was made by Wozo and Tatto on the Wozo website and in the
internet advertisements mediated by Adknowledge (to the extent that internet advertisements
represented that consumers would receive a “free” poster from Wozo for 99 cents) at the various
times when Chang and the members of his purported classes visited the Wozo website and the
websites hosting the aforementioned internet advertisements.  D. 23 ¶¶ 40-55, 73-75, 77-79.7  These
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allegations are sufficient to allow Chang’s complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, even under the
higher pleading standard set by Rule 9(b).
4.  Allegations Against Adknowledge
Adknowledge asserted in its initial brief that “Chang does not allege any facts alleging that
Adknowledge was responsible for or knew about Wozo’s poster offer, any content on the Wozo
website, or any unlawful charges,” and that the allegations in Chang’s amended complaint “indicate
that he was injured by Wozo–not by Adknowledge.”  D. 27 at 16.  Adknowledge argued that,
accordingly, Chang’s amended complaint fails to state a claim against Adknowledge (as opposed
to against Wozo and Tatto) upon which relief can be granted.  D. 27 at 16.  Adknowledge’s
argument misreads Chang’s amended complaint, which specifically alleges that Adknowledge,
Wozo and Tatto “partnered . . . to offer Super Rewards Points as part of [Wozo and Tatto]’s ‘free’
poster promotion,” D. 23 ¶ 60; that Adknowledge, together with Wozo and Tatto, “created and
developed a promotional campaign as joint venturers, including banners and other advertisements
offering a free poster and Super Rewards Points to consumers for a 99-cent shipping fee,” D. 23 ¶
60; that “each” defendant “placed such banners and other advertisements on the internet,” D. 23 ¶
60; that these advertisements did not make any reference to the poster club or its $29.99 recurring
monthly fee, D. 23 ¶ 60; that “Adknowledge was not simply acting as a neutral intermediary placing
internet advertisements for [Wozo and Tatto] in various locations on the internet” but instead
“agreed to jointly promote its own product, Super Rewards Points, with [Wozo and Tatto]’s product,
a purportedly free poster, in a single advertisement for a single price,” D. 23 ¶ 61; and that Chang
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and members of one of his purported classes are Super Rewards Points users and were harmed when
they clicked on these advertisements, filled out order forms on the Wozo website consistent with the
terms of these advertisements, and were then subjected to recurring monthly $29.99 fees.  D. 23 ¶¶
6, 72-75, 78.  Acknowledge may dispute the accuracy of these factual allegations,8 but resolution
of that dispute is appropriate at summary judgment or trial, not at the motion to dismiss stage.
5.  The Communications Decency Act
Adknowledge’s final argument is that the federal Communications Decency Act (“CDA”)
provides immunity from entities like Adknowledge from claim arising from content created or
developed by a third party.  D. 27 at 17-23.  Adknowledge points specifically to section 230 of the
CDA, which states that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider” and
that “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local
law that is inconsistent with this section.”  47 U.S.C. §§ 230(c)(1), (e)(3).  Under these statutory
clauses, an entity “is immunized from a state law claim if:  (1) [it] is a ‘provider or user of an
interactive computer service’; (2) the claim is based on ‘information provided by another
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information content provider’; and (3) the claim would treat [the entity] ‘as the publisher or speaker’
of that information.”  Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 418 (1st Cir.
2007).  However, “an interactive computer service provider remains liable for its own speech.”  Id.
at 419.  Put another way, CDA immunity does not apply if the interactive computer service provider
is also an “information content provider,” which is defined in the CDA as an entity that is
“responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of” any allegedly fraudulent
“information.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).
As discussed above, Adknowledge and Chang dispute whether the content of the internet
advertisements at the heart of this case were developed solely by Wozo and Tatto or whether the
content was developed at least in part by Adknowledge.  Compare D. 23 ¶¶ 6, 72-75, 78 (allegations
in Chang’s amended complaint) with D. 27 at 17-23, D. 38 at 7-8 (assertions in Adknowledge’s
various briefs).  This is a dispute of fact that cannot be resolved at this juncture.9  
VI.  Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Defendants’ various motions to dismiss are DENIED.
So ordered.
/s/ Denise J. Casper
United States District Judge
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